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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred statutorily by
Section 77-18a-l, et seq., U.C.A., (1953) as amended, allowing an
appeal of right from the final judgment of conviction, whether by
plea or verdict.

Appeal was taken herein by filing a Notice of

Appeal with the clerk of the Seventh Judicial District Court, in
and for the County of Carbon, State of Utah, from which the
appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The United States Constitution, Amendment 4, and the State
of Utah Constitution, Article I Section 14 prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures even of parolees.

By allowing officers,

whether probation and parole or otherwise, to search the vehicle
and premise without a warrant, these constitutional protections
were violated and the trial court should have suppressed the
evidence gathered during the unlawful search and the verdict
should be overturned.

This is a determination of law, wherein a

factual setting was applied to legal principals.

The appellate

Court should apply a nondeferential review for correction.
The use of Adult Probation and Parole officers to perform
warrantless

searches

was

done

with

the

express

intent

of

circumventing the Fourth Amendment and Section Fourteen privacy
rights.

Therefore, any evidence gathered pursuant to such arrest

should

have

been

suppressed,
1

and

the

verdict

should

be
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Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon County, State
of

Utah

and

from

a

ruling

on

a Motion

to

Suppress, held

immediately prior to the jury trial herein, wherein the Honorable
Judge Bruce K. Halliday, denied Defendant's Motion to suppress
certain evidence.

Defendant claimed the evidence was gathered

illegally, and in violation of constitutional protections.
trial

court

did

not

issue

separate

findings

of

fact

conclusions of law on its ruling on Defendant's Motion.

The
or
The

Motion is attached in the addenda.
Defendant was convicted by the jury of all counts contained
in the information, a copy of which is attached hereto within the
addenda.

Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of one (1) to

fifteen (15) years on Count I of the information against him; and
one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Counts II, III, IV, V, for each
count, and for each term to run concurrently with each other but
consecutive to the term for Count I; and one (1) year on County
VI, to run concurrently with the term for Count I; and one (1) to
fifteen (15) years on Count VII, to run consecutively with the
terms for Counts II, III, IV, and V.

A copy of the sentence and

commitment is attached in the addenda.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A seven

(7) count information against the Defendant was

filed in this matter on or about the 28th day of March, 1994, by
the Carbon County Attorney.

A preliminary hearing was held on or

about the 5th day of April, 1994. At the preliminary hearing the
3
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Officer Mele was tn- <

contacted

by

a

female

driver

who

informed

him

that

she

had

followed a brown vehicle, with license no. 583 FAB, containing
three

Hispanic

males,

from

vehicle

was

driving

officer

that

the vehicle

Wellington

erratically.
exited

to

This
from

Price
driver

and

that

the

informed

the

SR-6 and travelled

into

Price, then turned into the local Ace Lumber Yard.
Officer Mele steered his patrol vehicle to the Ace Lumber
Yard.

He did not encounter the ATL vehicle there, and proceeded

into the Melody Estates Trailer Park, adjacent to the Ace Lumber
Yard.

Cruising through the trailer park, Officer Mele observed

what he believed was the ATL vehicle, bearing license plate no.
581

FAB, parked

at

Trailer

No.

41.

Officer Mele knew

trailer 41 belonged to Teddy Kinneman.

that

He parked his vehicle

immediately behind the brown Ford and radioed for back up on the
police radio.

Officer Mele exited his own vehicle and knocked on

the door of Trailer No. 41.
a

After 30 seconds the door opened and

"Hispanic

looking male" presented himself, shutting the door

behind him.

Back up arrived about this time, and two other law

enforcement officers, began looking at the ATL vehicle, which by
this time had been identified as belonging to a third party, not
the "Hispanic looking male."
In the vehicle were two rifles.
the

"Hispanic-looking

male",

The officers present told

identified

as

Matthew

Thomas

Roberts, that they were going to open the vehicle to retrieve the
firearms in an effort to maintain public safety.
retrieved

the

firearms, and,

after being
5

The officers

run on the National

Crime Information Computer (NCIC) and showing clean, were placed
in the trunk of one of the law enforcement officer's vehicles for
"safe keeping." In the meantime, the "Hispanic-looking male" had
been placed under arrest for having been a restricted person in
possession of a firearm.

At this time, having been told by the

arrested man that no-one else was in the trailer, but hearing
noises from within, the law enforcement officers requested that
Adult Probation and Parole Officers come to Trailer No. 41 to
look for criminals.
The

AP&P

officers

entered

the

dwelling

and

therein

encountered two other persons, one by the name of John Daniel
Pimental,
Pimental

and

the

other

the

Appellant,

Amorico

Archuletta.

and Archuletta were both immediately handcuffed and

escorted to patrol vehicles.
the Carbon County Jail.

Archuletta was then transported to

Pimental was set free.

The officers then proceeded to search the vehicle.

The

officers determined that they would search without a warrant
because of the status of Roberts as a parolee.

During their

search, the officers recovered miscellaneous items including a
briefcase,

a

camera,

some

clothing

cartridges, and a small change bank.

items,

reloaded

rifle

The officer's then opened

the brief case and read the papers inside.

Some papers had the

name and address of Veloy Sorensen of 550 Edgehill in Sunnyside,
Utah.

The

officers contacted

other law officers from East

Carbon, a community near Sunnyside, and requested that they check
out this address.

The East Carbon officers determined from their
6

inspection of the property that it had been forcibly entered.
Archuletta was arrested for trespassing, and later charged with
the offenses of which he was convicted in the trial in this
matter.

ISSUES PRESENTED
(A) Whether the trial court erred by failing to suppress
evidence gathered from the vehicle without a search warrant, when
those officers knew the vehicle was owned by a third party and
when there were no exigent circumstances.
(B) Whether the use of Adult Probation and Parole Officers
by Price City Police Officers was done with an intent to, and the
effect

of,

circumventing

U.S.

Constitution

4th

Amendment

protection and State of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14
protection.
(C) Whether the trial court erred by failing to dismiss
counts three through six of the Information against Archuletta
because the charges each arose out of the same criminal conduct,
with the same elements being supplied by the same conduct of the
defendant.
(D) Whether the evidence presented at trial supported the
conviction of the Defendant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence was not granted
by the Trial Court.

The Defendant argues that the Trial Court
7

erred by failing to suppress evidence gathered during that search
because the search performed on the vehicle involved in this
matter was done without the benefit of a warrant and that a
warrant should have been obtained prior to any search.

Defendant

argues that there existed no exigent circumstances, that the
vehicle belonged to a third party, not present at the time of the
search, and no proper permission was given for the search that
was performed and the initial search was performed prior to the
arrival of any AP&P officers.
enforcement

officers

The Defendant argues that the law

collaborated

with

officers

from

Adult

Probation and Parole because they either couldn't obtain a search
warrant or didn't desire to expend the energy to do so.

While

acknowledging that there are some limitations placed on the 4th
Amendment rights and Article I Section 14 rights on a parolee, a
non-probation and parole officer cannot obtain the assistance of
the AP&P officer

for the purpose of avoiding the rights to

privacy which do exist.

The Defendant was convicted of all seven

counts contained in an information against him after a jury
trial.

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing

counts three through six of the information to remain as separate
counts where each count alleged the theft of a firearm during the
course of the came criminal episode and the exact same conduct of
the Defendant.

Finally, the Defendant argues that the evidence

offered at trial was insufficient to meet the State's burden of
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty
of the crimes contained in the information.
8

ARGUMENT
I.
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 4,
AND THE STATE OF UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I SECTION
14 PROHIBIT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES EVEN OF
PAROLEES. BY ALLOWING OFFICERS, WHETHER PROBATION AND
PAROLE OR OTHERWISE, TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE AND PREMISE
WITHOUT A WARRANT, THESE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION WERE
VIOLATED, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED THE
EVIDENCE GATHERED DURING THE UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND THE
VERDICT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.
77b^n Officer Mele first approached Trailer 41 in the Melody
Esta*: :

trailer park, he did not know Roberts, the "Hispanic-

looking male" who exited the residence.
fellow

was

probation

a
and

parolee.
parole

In

addition,

officer.

This

He did not know this

Officer Mele was not a
being

the

case,

Roberts

should have enjoyed the full benefits of the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and Section 14 of Article I of the Utah
State Constitution.

Officer Mele should have had probable cause

that a crime was being committed to engage Roberts longer than
was reasonably necessary to effect his purpose for the encounter.
It is confusing to know what exactly the purpose for the
encounter was and just what crime the law enforcement officers
thought was being committed by the "three suspicious Hispanics."
At

no

time

reasonable
books

did

any

officer

articulate

suspicion of wrong doing.

prohibiting

the

personal

the

or

argument

Officer Mele pulled up.

that

anyone

sale

was

cause

or

There is no law on the
of

individual, whether Hispanic or otherwise.
evidence

probable

a

firearm

by

an

Certainly there is no

selling

a weapon

when

The possession of a firearm in a vehicle
9

is expressly permitted by Section 76-10-510, U.C.A. (1991) as
amended.

The only other issue before the officer when he pulled

up was that of a report of erratic driving by someone in a
vehicle matching the description of the vehicle in the driveway
of Trailer 41. The matter gets a little more confusing in review
because the officer radioed for back-up.

It appears the officer

was expecting trouble, but the record does not clearly reflect
why.

No officer ever articulated why the show of force was, or

that

it

ever became, necessary.

Shortly

after arriving at

Trailer 41, there were three law enforcement officers and two
parole officers.

Nevertheless, no probable cause was set forth

as to why there was a need to search either vehicle or residence
in this matter, especially without a warrant.
In any

case, such a search would

issuance of a warrant.

normally

require the

The vehicle was parked in the driveway.

This was not a traffic stop on the highway attendant with the
normal exigent circumstances.

If the officers wanted to get

inside the vehicle, they should have obtained a warrant.

One

officer could have easily remained and observed the residence and
parked vehicle while either of the other two complied with the
paper trail of the warrant.

In fact, the officers took time to

obtain the keys from the vehicle's owner to open the trunk, but
didn't

even

bother

to

ask

permission

transcript page 50, lines 11 through 21).
might

be

more

apparent

what

crime

committed.
10

to

search.

(Trial

Were that the case, it

they

thought

was

being

State v. Leonard, (Utah App.) 825 P. 2d 674 (1991) requires
that the police

intrusion be performed by the least intrusive

manner reasonably possible.
S.Ct.

1868,

20

L.Ed. 2d

Where Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88

889

(1968)

and

its

progeny

are

not

applicable, (no moving encounter) a search warrant should issue.
In State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah 1990) the Supreme Court
held that law enforcement officers were not justified in opening
the unlocked car door to verify a VIN number.
held,

would

searches.

violate

the

prohibition

To do so, they

against

unreasonable

They indicated that both probable cause and exigent

circumstances must be present prior to a warrantless intrusion.
Quoting State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the Court wrote:
Once the threat that the suspect will injure the
officers with concealed weapons or will destroy
evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why the
officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant.
Such a requirement would present little impediment to
police investigations, especially in light of the ease
with which warrants can be obtained under Utah's
telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 7-234(92) (1982 ed.)
This

language

is

especially

relevant

herein.

Officer

Mele

immediately radioed for back-up when he pulled into the driveway
of Trailer 41. (Trial Transcript page 14, lines 10 through 25 and
page 15, lines 1 through 8 ) .

That back-up arrived very quickly.

The officer could just have easily requested a warrant over the
radio, in addition to the back-up.

The only person in the

vicinity of the vehicle, who could pose a threat, was Roberts,
and he was being questioned by Mele.

The other two officers were

available to obtain a warrant if the Officers had probable cause
11

that a crime was being committed.
The law enforcement officers appeared to justify their lack
of a warrant on the fact that Roberts was a parolee, (Trial
Transcript page 18 lines 21 through 24) even through at the time
of the initial search of the vehicle to obtain the firearms there
was no knowledge that Roberts was a parolee or that a crime was
being committed.

Nevertheless, while parolees' rights to privacy

are somewhat restricted, they still have such rights.

The law

has been set forth regarding the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth
Section of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
State

v.

Velasquez,

significant direction.

672

P. 2d

1254,

(Utah

1983),

provides

The Court stated:

...Thus, although a warrant based on probable cause is
not generally required, a parole officer must have
reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee
has violated the terms of his parole or committed a
crime. Velasquez, at 1260.
Additionally,
. . . Since the rationale of the rule we adopt is that a
'reasonable search7 rule is a condition of parole
necessary to the operation of the parole system, it
follows that the rule applies regardless of the
language of the parole agreement. The term "reasonable
grounds" does not mean that which would be necessary
for probable cause.
Rather, it means a reasonable
suspicion that a parolee has committed a parole
violation or crime....The search, however, must be
reasonably related to the parole officer's duty. People
v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 371 N.E.2d
794 (1977); State v. Sims, supra, 10 Wash.App. at 88,
516 P.2d at 1096. Velasquez, at 1260.
The Velasquez court also cited State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho
227, 657 P.2d 1095, 1101 (App.1983), quoting State v. Sims, 10
12

Wash.App. 75, 88, 516 P.2d 1099, 1096 (1973), stating:
For searches conducted by parole officers pursuant
to the reasonable suspicion standard, '(a) search
cannot be based upon a mere hunch without factual
basis, nor upon 'casual rumor, general reputation, or
mere whim.'
Notwithstanding any provision of any parole agreement, the
reasonable search rule is applicable.

In order to perform any

search of a parole, the parole officer must have reasonable
suspicion that the parole has committed a parole violation or
crime.
Perhaps

Thus, the reasonable suspicion rule is applicable herein.
the

probation

and

parole

officers

would

have

had

reasonable suspicion to initially search the vehicle, however, if
Roberts had stated to them he was driving the vehicle, as he
purportedly did to Officer Mele, the AP&P officers might have
observed the weapons, and they could have arrested Roberts for a
parole violation.

As it happened, the law enforcement officers

had already conducted an unreasonable search of the vehicle and
obtained the weapons.

The harm had already been done to the

investigation and everything from that point out became fruit of
an illegal search.

Had Officer Mele waited, and informed Adult

Probation and Parole personnel he had a parolee, admitting to
driving a vehicle with weapons inside, there might have been
reasonable suspicion to open the vehicle and obtain the weapons.
In this matter, there were three searches performed.

The

first was when the officer checked the firearms in the vehicle.
The next was the search of the residence and the third was the
lengthy and comprehensive search of the subject vehicle again.
13

In all three searches, there was never a warrant sought.

After

the law enforcement officers searched the vehicle they should
have satisfied themselves that there was no further crime being
committed, or at the very least, that there were no further
justifications for a warrantless search.

Roberts, by then known

to be a parolee, had been arrested, although arguably illegally.
The weapons had been run through NCIC and III and had shown
clear.

Roberts had also admitted to driving the vehicle.

All

purposes for which the police officers had converged on the
residence were then satisfied.

The officers could only act on

the information they had at any given time.
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988).

The guns were not stolen and the

reckless driver had been arrested.
had no other valid suspicions.
ended there.

State v, Baird, 763

The law enforcement officers

The police encounter should have

If the officers had further concerns about any of

the property, a warrant should have been obtained.
failed

to

obtain

a

warrant,

when

no

exigent

existed, whether they had additional probable

Because they
circumstances

cause or even

reasonable suspicion or not, the subsequent searches, and all
they revealed, including the burglarized residence in Sunnyside,
should have been suppressed.
residence

and

knew

he

They officers knew the owner of the

did

occupants of the vehicle.

not

fit

the

description

of the

There was no reasonable suspicion of

him and thus, no reason to enter his residence.
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II. THE USE OF ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICERS TO
PERFORM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES WAS DONE WITH THE EXPRESS
INTENT OF CIRCUMVENTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
SECTION FOURTEEN PRIVACY RIGHTS.
THEREFORE, ANY
EVIDENCE GATHERED PURSUANT TO SUCH ARREST SHOULD HAVE
BEEN SUPPRESSED.

While parolees have lesser rights of privacy than ordinary
citizens, they nevertheless have privacy rights.
that

the

probation

specifically

to

and

parole

parolees

enforcement officers.

officers

which

are

have

It is accepted
powers

distinct

from

relating

other

law

However, these powers are still subject to

those rights of privacy existing in parolees.

It is very clear

that law enforcement officers cannot use the distinct authorities
of probation officers for the purpose of circumventing warrant
requirements.

United

States

v.

Gordon,

540

F.2d

452

(9th

Cir.1976), quoted in State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987).
The Johnson court stated, "...we have warned that police officers
may not use parole officers simply as a means of avoiding the
warrant requirements to conduct random searches..."

The Court

also stated that while a parole officer's search is not unlawful
just because it is also beneficial to the police, "...That does
not,

however,

sanction

officers and police."
In
concerns

this

matter,

expressed

by

unlimited

complicity

between

parole

Johnson at 1072.
as

has

the

Roberts had been addressed.

been

police

set

forth,

in their ATL

all
and

legitimate
arrest of

While they had already erred by
15

extracting the rifles from the vehicle without a warrant, even
they

recognized

the

need

for a warrant to proceed further.

Nevertheless, they turned to the AP&P officers to do something
they could not do themselves.

The police officers must have

known they were against a wall as far as continuing any police
encounter.

They turned to the AP&P officers.

officers were at the same point.
known

to AP&P

anything wrong.

as being

However, the AP&P

Roberts was the only person

under their auspices, who had done

He was already under arrest.

While they stated

at trial that the owner of the trailer, Teddy Kinneman, was a
parolee, he did not fit the description of one of the three
persons in the vehicle, nor was he present.
probable

causes

committed,

or of

or

reasonable

suspicion

There was no other
of

a

crime

being

a parole being violated, once Roberts was

arrested.

III. COUNTS THREE (3) THROUGH SIX (6) WERE
IDENTICAL AND INVOLVED THE SAME CONDUCT AND SAME
ELEMENTS. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED COUNTS
FOUR (4), FIVE (5) AND SIX (6) AS BEING REPETITIVE AND
CONTRARY TO SECTION 76-6-412 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
(1953), AS AMENDED.
Section 76-6-412, et seq., Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as
amended, deals with theft, categorizing the various offenses,
some as to value, others as to the nature of the property.
language

states

in

applicable

part,

"Theft

The

of property and

services as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as a
felony of the second degree if the property stolen is a firearm.
In the case at hand a part of the property alleged stolen was
16

firearms.

The question becomes, because there was more than one

firearm alleged stolen in the self same incident, would there be
more than one charge or count?

Section 76-1-402 et seq., U.C.A.

(1953) as amended, provides "...when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of
this code, the act
provision..."

shall be punishable under only one such

Section

401

provides

that

a

single

criminal

episode means "all conduct which is closely related in time and
is incident

to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single

criminal objective.

In State v. Thompson, 571 P. 2d 805 (Utah

App. 1988), the Court of Appeals, discussing whether a bribe was
one bribe or several separate bribes said "...the existence of a
single offense or multiple offenses is a question of intent to be
determined by the particular facts and circumstances of each
case."

State v. Kimball, 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980), quoted

in Thompson, adds, "...If there is but one intent, one general
impulse,

and

one

plan,

even

through

there

transactions, there is but one offense."
was clearly only one plan.

is

a

series of

In this matter there

As alleged, the burglary took place

at one time, all the items from the burglary were removed at the
same time.
one

Even though there were more than one firearm, it was

transaction,

one

plan

and

one

impulse.

The state, by

charging the balance of the property in one general count of
theft, bears this out.

Otherwise, each item taken would have

been charged as a separate offense.
17

The firearms would be a

separate count because the theft of firearms, as an item or type
of property, have been established to be a more severe crime than
for instance the theft of CD tapes (or cupcakes, as the Court
reasoned; trial transcript, page

101, lines

10 through 12.)

However, there should have been charged only one more severe
crime of theft and one lesser crime of theft,

IV. THE EVIDENCE, ALONG WITH ALL RATIONAL
INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM, OF THE THEFT OF FIREARMS
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF THE
DEFENDANT BY THE JURY.
State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 443 (Utah 1983) requires "...the
fabric of the evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt."
Petree at 444.

The evidence against the Defendant regarding the

firearms is merely the single fingerprint on the jewelry box.
While

interesting,

the

single

fingerprint

sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
direct evidence against the Defendant.

should

not

be

There was no other
His presence at the

Trailer No. 41 was used by the State initially to arrest him for
trespass,

as

he

supposedly

had

no

right

to

be

there.

Eyewitnesses couldn't identify Defendant with much accuracy or
assurance.

Continuing in Petree, at 444, the court said "...But

this does not mean that the court can take a speculative leap
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.

The

evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
re J.S.H., 642 P.2d 386 (Utah 1982);
18

State in

State v. Kourbelas, 621

P.2d 1238, 1240 (1980).
There was no physical evidence linking the Defendant to the
firearms, as was admitted several times during the course of the
trial.

No fingerprints were even attempted to be lifted off the

firearms.

There were no accounts of seeing the defendant in the

proximity of the weapons at any point in time.

The trial court

should have taken great pains to avoid allowing the jury to allow
a rational inference to become a presumption of guilt.

Rational

inference should only add to the proof, not replace the burden of
proof.

CONCLUSION
In the first instance, all of the evidence gathered by law
enforcement

personnel

and

parole

officers

suppressed by the trial court below.

should

have

been

The officers proceeded to

search without probable cause and without exigent circumstances,
and without a warrant.

The trial court erred in allowing the

evidence to remain without making such a finding that exigent
circumstances, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion existed in
the situation or the minds of the officers present.

The trial

court should also have found that the parole officers were merely
tools of the

law enforcement officers in this occasion, there

being too much complicity between them.

The trial court erred

when it allowed four separate theft of firearm counts to remain
pending against the Defendant, when there existed one general
criminal

episode,

one

impulse,
19

and

one

plan.

Finally,

the

evidence introduced at the trial was insufficient to sustain the
burden of the State to convict the Defendant of the thefts of the
firearms beyond a reasonable doubt.
DATED this

day of October, 1994.

David M. Allred
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the
day of October, 1994, I sent to
Jan Graham, UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Utah State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, four true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing instrument, by depositing same
in the U.S. Mail, postage fully prepaid.

10/11/94 DMA51601
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GEORGE M. HARMOND, JR. #1375
Deputy County Attorney
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

vs.
126-3-94
AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA
230 N 400 W
Price, UT 84501
DOB: 7/1/51

Criminal No.

S^LLWUB-ES

Criminal No. <3-MJ^nn^n P^r

MATTHEW THOMAS ROBERTS
230 N 400 W
Price, UT 84501
DOB: 8/15/71

Judge

Defendant(s)

"-HfJili/K

fr

COMES NOV/, Carbon County Attorney and states on information and belief
that the above-named defendant(s) committed the following crime(s):
DATE J

On or about March 23, 1994

PLACE:

Carbon County, State of Utah

COUNT Ii BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of
Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said
defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, unlawfully entered the dwelling of
another with the intent to commit a theft, to-wit: house belonging to VELOY
SORENSONj
COUNT II: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit:
Remington Model 700, .243 cal. rifle;
COUNT III: THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit:
Winchester Model 70, .270 cal. rifle?

COUNTY ATTORNEY'S
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INFORMATION
PAGE 2
126-3-94
COUNT TVt THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit:
Mauser .243 cal. rifle;
COUNT Vt THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Section
76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at
the time and place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over
the property of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit:
Savage .22 cal. rifle;
COUNT VIt THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that the said defendant, at the time and
place aforesaid, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property
of another, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, to-wit: binoculars,
bullets, clothing valued at more than $100.00 but less than $250.00;
COUNT VII: POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY ^ P A R O L E E ] a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Section 76-10-503 (2) (a), Ufeah-Gede Annotated, 1953, as amended,
in that the said defendant, at the time and place aforesaid, jghile opparole
from the Utah State Prison, did have in his possession, or under his custody or
control a firearm;
contrary to the provisions of the aforesaid statute, and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Utah.
THIS INFORMATION is based on evidence obtained from the following
witnesses: Robert Setzer/644140 & 644135 & 940161
DATED t h i s

22L day of March, 1994.
JR.
*GE MyHARMOND,
HARMOND, JR.
Deputy County Attorney

GEORGE/mew/3/28/94
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David M. Allred, #6463
Attorney for Defendant
Post Office Box 575
26 East Main Street
Castle Dale, UT 84513
(801) 381-5326
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]
> MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
)1 MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING

Plaintiff,

vs.
AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA
Defendant.

I

CRIMINAL NO. 941700140 FS

i

Judge Bruce Halliday

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, David M.
Allred, and respectfully moves this court for an Order:
1.
Defendant

Suppressing

ail

pre-Maranda

statements

made

by

the

to police officer Kevin Mele and or any other law

enforcement officer on or about March 23, 1994, at Melody esteres
Trailer

Court,

Price,

Utah

or

elsewhere,

in

violation

of

Defendant's constitutional rights including Amendment V of the
Untied States Constitution aid Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution; and also suppressing all evidence obtained as "fruit"
of the Defendant's statements or any evidence obtained from those
statements; and
2.

Suppressing all evidence seized on or about March 23,

23

1994, from the searches of the automobile described in the police
reports in this case as a 1976 Ford Torino, brown in color, Utah
license plate 581 FAB, including but not limited to the firearms,
binoculars, and

briefcase

and

its

contents, as

unreasonable

warrantless searches and seizures in violation of the Defedant's
Constitution rights including Amendment IV of the Untied States
Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
This motion is made pursuant

to Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure Rule 12.

DATED this ^ ^

day of June, 1994

David M. Allred
Attorney for the Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO GEORGE M. HARMOND, DEPUTY CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY:
Notice is hereby given that Defendants Motion to Suppress wilj^
come on regularly for hearing before the above Court on the ^rjf —
day of July, 1994 at 3*'€C4/y
or as soon thereafter as counsel cqn
be heard.
Dated this

^- /

day of June^l994
David M. Allred
Attorney for the Defendant
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GEORGE M. HARMOND, JR. #1375
Deputy County Attorney
Carbon County Courthouse
120 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
(801) 637-4700
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

i
I

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
TO STATE PRISON

AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA,

i

Criminal No. 941700139 FS

Defendant.

The above-named defendant appeared on July 29, 1994, together with his
attorney of record, DAVID M. ALLRED, for Jury Trial, and having been found
guilty of the charge(s) of COUNT Is
Felony? COUNT II:

BURGLARY OF A DWELLING, a Second Degree

THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony? COUNT III:

THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony; COUNT IV:
Second Degree Felony; COUNT V:
COUNT VI:

THEFT OF A FIREARM, a

THEFT OF A FIREARM, a Second Degree Felony?

THEFT, a Class A Misdemeanor? COUNT VII:

POSSESSION OF A FIREARM

BY A PAROLEE, a Second Degree Felony, and having advised the Court that he
had no legal reason to state why judgment should not be pronounced, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises?
IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT that the said AMORICO RAMON
ARCHULETTA serve a term in the Utah State Prison of one (1) to fifteen (15)
years on Count I? and one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Counts II, III, IV, V
for each count and to run concurrently with each other but consecutively with
Count I? and one (1) year on Count VI to run concurrently with Count I? and
one (1) to fifteen (15) years on Count VII to run consecutively with II, III,
IV, V?
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You, the said AMORICO RAMON ARCHULETTA, are hereby rendered into the
custody of the Sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, to be by him delivered
into the custody of thgJftarden, or other proper officer of said State Prison.
DATED this

//}

day of August, 1994.
BY THE CO

APPROVED
PPROVED AS TO
T FORM AND CONTENT:
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